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The Quest to Bring Land under Social and Political Control:  
Land Reform Struggles of the Past and Present in Ecuador 
Geoff Goodwin
1
 
‘History never really says goodbye.  
History says, see you later’ 
Eduardo Galeano 
Land reform was one of the most important policies introduced in Latin America in the 
twentieth century and remains high on the political agenda due to sustained pressure from 
rural social movements. Improving our understanding of the issue therefore remains a 
pressing concern. This paper responds to this need by proposing a new theoretical 
framework to explore land reform and providing a fresh analysis of historical and 
contemporary land struggles in Ecuador. Drawing on the pioneering work of Karl Polanyi, 
the paper characterizes these struggles as the attempt to increase the social and political 
control of land in the face of mounting commodification. The movement started in the 1960s 
and remains evident in Ecuador today. Exploring land reform in Ecuador from this 
theoretical perspective provides new insight into land struggles in the country and 
contributes to debates over land reforms of the past and present elsewhere in the Global 
South. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Land reform was one of the most important policies introduced in Latin America in the late 
twentieth century. Its timing, character and reach varied significantly but its impact was 
typically profound, dismantling the traditional hacienda complex, transforming rural 
societies, and reconfiguring state-society relations. Its initial role in capitalist development 
was diverse and complex, placing restrictions on the use, ownership and exchange of land on 
the one hand, while incorporating peasant producers and agricultural cooperatives into 
markets and promoting capitalist production on the other. The transition from ‘state’ to 
‘market’ directed land reform at the end of the century reduced the tension between these two 
dimensions and accelerated capitalist development in rural Latin America (Borras et al. 
2008). However, the move embedded or widened existing land inequalities and paved the 
way for a new cycle of land struggles. Since the turn of the millennium rural social 
movements have increased pressure on states to expand the regulation and redistribution of 
land across the region (Moyo and Yeros 2006; Courville et al. 2006). Pressure has been 
strongest in countries where ‘centre-left’ and ‘left-wing’ governments have taken power but 
also intense in other cases. Despite the urbanization of Latin American societies and the 
declining role of agriculture in Latin American economies, issues related to the use, control 
and distribution of rural land remain high on the social and political agenda.  Improving our 
understanding of land reform therefore remains a pressing concern.  
I respond to this need in this paper by proposing a new theoretical framework to explore 
land reform and providing a fresh analysis of historical and contemporary land struggles in 
Ecuador. Drawing on the pioneering work of Karl Polanyi, I characterize these struggles as 
the attempt to increase the social and political control of land in the face of mounting 
commodification. The framework I propose challenges neoliberal approaches which 
conceptualize land as a commodity and fetishize private property rights and market 
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mechanisms. I explain the theoretical case Karl Polanyi makes for the redistribution and 
regulation of land and the existence of countermovements which contest land 
commodification. Ecuador provides fascinating terrain to explore these issues as it 
experienced a number of powerful land-related mobilizations in the late twentieth century and 
has witnessed a prolonged struggle to transform land laws, policies and institutions since the 
turn of the millennium.  I provide new insight into these struggles by analyzing land reform 
from a fresh theoretical perspective, connecting historical and current conflicts, and using a 
variety of new source materials.
2
 These include national and local newspaper archives, 
interviews with indigenous leaders and communities, land reform archive materials, agrarian 
laws and legislative proposals, and a full official dataset of land reform.
3
 The focus of the 
analysis is highland indigenous peoples.
4
 Concentrating on indigenous land struggles is 
particularly interesting as indigenous communities and movements performed a pivotal role 
in historical land struggles but a marginal role in the recent conflict.  I seek to contribute to 
our understanding of this shift as well as illustrate the crucial role rural communities and 
movements have performed in driving land reform from below in Ecuador. 
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. The next section sketches the 
Polanyian theoretical framework I use to explore land reform in Ecuador. The third part 
examines indigenous land struggles between 1964 and 1994, focusing on indigenous attempts 
to transform land reform laws, policies and institutions and implement land reform from 
below. The fourth section then investigates current attempts to bring land under social and 
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 The most comprehensive account of Ecuadorian land reform remains Barsky (1988). Other important 
contributions come from Redclift (1978), Chiriboga (1988), Zevallos (1989) and Brassel et al. (2008).  
3
  I conducted the research during three visits to Ecuador between 2009 and 2015. 
4
 Ecuador’s highland indigenous population comprises various groups which are united by a single indigenous 
language (Kichwa) and a similar, if variegated, set of customs, habits and beliefs. The size of the population has 
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2010, indicates the rural indigenous population of the ten highland provinces was 559,575, approximately 20 per 
cent of the total rural highland population (INEC 2010). See Zamosc (1995) for earlier estimates of the size and 
evolution of the highland indigenous population.  
4 
 
political control in Ecuador, highlighting important continuities and discontinuities with 
earlier struggles. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the key points to emerge from the 
analysis and indicating avenues of future research.  
LAND REFORM THROUGH A POLANYIAN LENS 
Karl Polanyi provides a rich theoretical framework to analyze social and political struggles 
over land (Polanyi 1957, 2001).
5
 He highlights the perils of integrating land into markets, the 
crucial non-economic functions land performs in society, and the tendency for people to 
organize and mobilize to contest commodification. Of the various concepts he developed, 
three are particularly valuable for exploring land reform: double movement, fictitious 
commodities and forms of integration. Below I briefly discuss these concepts and explain 
how they help us improve our understanding of land reform. The section is succinct: a 
detailed discussion of Polanyian social theory and alternative theoretical approaches to land 
reform is outside the scope of this paper.  
Double Movement 
Polanyi developed the ‘double movement’ to explain the breakdown of liberal capitalism and 
rise of fascism in the 1930s (Polanyi 2001). While he did not posit the concept as a universal 
law that applies to capitalist societies across time and space, similar patterns to the ones he 
identified have been evident since the demise of liberal capitalism. Numerous scholars have 
noted these trends and various readings of the double movement have emerged.
6
 The 
interpretation I offer suggests modern capitalist societies comprise two forces: the movement 
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towards the creation, expansion and liberalisation of markets (commodification) and the 
countermovement towards the regulation of markets, the strengthening of the state, and the 
promotion of alternative forms of economic organisation (decommodification). Capitalism 
evolves through a continuous and simultaneous process of commodification and 
decommodification, movement and countermovement. Capitalist societies reproduce 
themselves but without resolving the underlying contradiction between the two sides of the 
double movement. I analyze land reform in Ecuador from this broad theoretical perspective, 
arguing both sides of the double movement were in operation from the 1960s onwards. That 
is, land reform simultaneously promoted the commodification and decommodification of 
land.
7
  
Table 1  
Double movement dimensions of land reform in Ecuador 
 1964 to 1994 
Commodification  Private property rights conditioned on the economic use of land 
 Proscription of traditional peasant-patron practices (e.g. huasipungo) 
 Protection of private property rights to utilized and productive land 
 Conversion of usufruct rights into private property rights  
 Proliferation of private property titles 
 Bolstering of rural cadastres 
Decommodification  Redistribution of private and state owned land 
 Proliferation and partial protection of collective land titles  
 Regulation of division and transfer of rural land 
 Landholding size limits* 
Source: My own elaboration based on land reform laws, associated legislation and official documents issued in Ecuador 
between 1964 and 1994. A full list of sources is available upon request. * From 1964 to 1973. 
Table 1 outlines these two dimensions of land reform in Ecuador. A full analysis of this 
process is outside the scope of this paper.
8
 The important point to note is that while land 
reform regulated and redistributed land it also stimulated and expanded land markets.
9
 It was 
part of a wider process of capitalist modernisation which accelerated in rural Ecuador in the 
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 Polanyi refers to ‘land’ in a broad sense, including habitats, natural resources and agriculture. I follow a 
narrower approach in this article, focusing on the integration of land into markets.  
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 See Goodwin (2014) for a detailed explanation.  
9
 Various studies have noted land market activity increased in rural Highland Ecuador in the 1960s and 1970s. 
See, for example, Martínez (1985) and Thurner (1989).   
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1960s and 1970s. Hence commodification was well advanced by the time laws and policies 
introduced in the 1980s and 1990s gave the market a greater role in determining the use and 
distribution of land.  
The double movement encourages us to view land reform from a fresh perspective. The 
concept forces us to consider the commodifying and decommodifying dimensions of land 
reform and examine the role land reform laws, policies and agencies perform in mediating 
these two forces. The ‘fictitious commodity’ concept enables us to delve deeper into this 
relationship.   
Fictitious Commodities 
Land is at the centre of the double movement. Polanyi labels it a ‘fictitious commodity’ 
because it is not produced for sale on the market and is a vital component of life and nature. 
Three dimensions of the concept are particularly important for the argument advanced in this 
paper.  
First, the intrinsic characteristics of land mean it does not behave like a genuine 
commodity (i.e. items that are produced and distributed in accordance with changes in the 
price mechanism). Land markets therefore exhibit certain peculiarities and rigidities.  Their 
most fundamental distinguishing characteristic is that the supply and location of land is fixed 
which means they cannot perpetually expand to accommodate increases in demand.
10
 The 
basic rigidity the intrinsic characteristics of land instil in land markets is accentuated by the 
deep and complex relationship that exists between humans and habitats and the crucial non-
economic functions land performs in society (political, cultural, spiritual etc.).
11
 In short, land 
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 This makes the redistribution of land inherently more problematic than the redistribution of income which 
tends to increase over time.  
11
  It is important to note that land performs important non-economic functions for landowning elites. While 
contemporary elites favour laws and policies that treat land as a commodity, the ownership and monopolisation 
of land gives them considerable political power.  
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cannot be reduced to a commodity which responds to changes in the market mechanism or 
viewed simply as a factor of production.   
Second, the fictional status of land as commodity ensures states perform central roles in 
the creation and regulation of land markets.
12
 Capitalism requires states to dismantle laws, 
policies, and institutions that impede markets and replace them with ones that promote 
commodification. Once land markets are established, states are compelled to regulate them. 
Hence even during the neoliberal phase of capitalism states have continued to regulate land 
markets to some degree.  Regulation takes multiple forms but generally determines: i) who is 
allowed to participate in markets (e.g. proscribe or permit foreign ownership of agricultural 
land); ii) which objects are legitimate items of exchange (e.g. prohibit or allow the transfer of 
communal land); and, iii) the rights and obligations of landowners (e.g. social and 
environmental functions of a land).
13
 These are important features of land reform. While the 
existing scholarship recognises this point, it tends to understate the regulatory dimension of 
land reform.
14
 Yet regulation is crucial. For example, once land is redistributed, effective 
regulation is required to stop inequalities remerging. Regulation is also required to ensure 
land is utilized appropriately, taking into account economic, social, cultural and ecological 
factors.  Communities and movements have important roles to perform in this process. 
Sustained social pressure is frequently required to force states to enforce land regulation due 
to the lack of state capacity and the political and economic power of landowning elites. 
Potential also exists for rural actors to participate directly in regulation. Enabling 
representatives of communities and movements to participate in public agencies and 
influence regulatory decisions has the potential to reduce the risk of elite capture, alleviate 
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 This point is captured in Polanyi’s famous assertion that the ‘road to the free market was opened and kept 
open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism’ (Polanyi 2001, 
146).  
13
 This classification draws on Chang (2003, 53-4). 
14
 For example, a Polanyian approach to land reform suggests a strong regulatory component should be added to 
the redistributive model proposed by Borras and McKinley (2006).  
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social conflict, and increase the impact of land reform. This has been a central demand of 
indigenous and peasant movements in Ecuador since the 1960s.  
Third, the concept suggests competing understandings of land emerge as capitalism 
evolves and political conflicts occur as different social classes attempt to impose their 
particular vision of land on the state. Viewed through this lens indigenous land struggles in 
Ecuador in the late twentieth century appear not only as a fight for the control of land but a 
battle over the meaning of land.
15
  
Forms of Integration 
Polanyi developed the ‘forms of integration’ to provide a broad schema to analyze economic 
organization across space and time. The concept also indicates the alternative mechanisms 
through which land can be organized. Three broad patterns are posited: reciprocity, 
redistribution and market exchange. Theoretically and empirically, the three forms coexist 
but one pattern dominates – or ‘integrates’ economic life. Crucially, to become integrative, 
the particular form of integration requires specific social, political and economic institutions 
or ‘supporting structures’ (Polanyi 1957, 252). Reciprocity necessitates symmetrical social 
groups; redistribution requires a central authority; and exchange needs a system of price-
making markets.  
While Polanyi developed the forms of integration to examine entire economies, the 
concept can be usefully applied to analyze particular sectors. The concept draws attention to 
the role land reform performs in organizing land at the macro and micro levels and the impact 
different organizational forms have on social and political structures. Land reform has the 
potential to combine all three forms of integration, providing support for reciprocal and 
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 Susana Sawyer’s illuminating analysis of the discussions over the reform of the Ley de Desarrollo Agrario 
reveals the starkly different conceptions of land indigenous peoples and landowning elites held in Ecuador in the 
1990s (the law and conflict are discussed below). Tellingly, her account also shows divergences existed between 
indigenous groups, with highland and lowland communities having their own particular, if still variegated, 
understandings of land. Her analysis indicates the importance of not drawing a clear line between ‘indigenous’ 
and ‘non-indigenous’ conceptions of land. See Sawyer (2004). 
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redistributive forms of land control at the local level while establishing mechanisms to 
redistribute land and regulate land markets at the national level. When viewing land reform 
from this perspective it is important to recognize that normative values should not be affixed 
to the particular forms a priori (Schaniel and Neale 2000). For example, redistributive 
regimes should not be automatically associated with positive attributes. Redistribution 
involves the movement of goods, services and resources to and from central authorities (e.g. 
state agencies, community councils).  The process might promote equality and freedom but it 
might also lead to the concentration of wealth and power. This highlights the need to pay 
close attention to the beneficiaries of land reform, the terms under which land is redistributed, 
and the structure of the authorities charged with the task of redistributing land.  
The next section explores indigenous efforts to transform and implement land reform in 
Ecuador from this theoretical perspective, viewing the struggle as part of a movement to 
bring land under social and political control as commodification advanced.  
RETHINKING ECUADORIAN LAND REFORM: INDIGENOUS EFFORTS TO BRING 
LAND UNDER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 
Land reform involves the regulation and redistribution of a vital and finite resource and 
therefore also involves social and political struggle. During the late twentieth century 
highland indigenous peoples engaged with the state in this struggle on two basic levels.
16
 The 
first related to the design and character of land reform. From the 1960s to 1990s, indigenous 
and peasant movements proposed radical changes to land reform laws, policies and 
institutions. The central aim of these proposals was to increase the regulation and 
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 Indigenous peoples also engaged with religious institutions in this struggle. The Catholic Church remained a 
prominent landowner in the 1960s and 1970s and transferred some of its land to indigenous families and 
communities. In some cases, land was distributed via IERAC but in others it was transferred directly. See Lyons 
(2006) for insight into the role religious institutions performed in land struggles in the highland region in the late 
twentieth century.   
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redistribution of land and create space for indigenous and peasant representation in land 
reform agencies.  The second related to the implementation of land reform. Overlapping with 
efforts to transform the overall structure and character of land reform, indigenous families, 
communities and movements exerted pressure on the state to enforce existing laws and 
policies. The central objective of these struggles was to improve indigenous access to land, 
both at the family and community levels.
17
  
These battles, as previously noted, took place in the context of mounting land 
commodification. Land reform not only provided indigenous families, communities and 
movements with a mechanism to obtain land but also to contain land markets and transform 
the role land performed in the rural economy and society. Drawing on Polanyi, I characterize 
this struggle as the attempt to bring land under social and political control. Indigenous and 
peasant movements aimed to achieve this by strengthening family and communal control of 
land at the local level while increasing social and political control of land at the national 
level.  
Three periods of heightened conflict and debate characterized this struggle (see Figure 1 
below). The episodes took place within particular social, political and economic contexts and 
therefore exhibited considerable variation. However, a number of continuities were also 
evident, not only between these three episodes but also between historical and contemporary 
struggles. First, demands for the heightened regulation and redistribution of land and the 
incorporation of indigenous and peasant representatives into land reform agencies were 
evident throughout. The latter was seen as a way of achieving the former. Second, collective 
organisation and mobilisation was crucial in driving land reform up the political agenda and 
forcing the state to regulate and redistribute land from the 1960s onwards. Third, the tactics 
indigenous peasant communities and movements employed to transform and implement land 
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 See Korovkin (1997), Martínez (1985, 1995, 2002), Bretón (1997, 2008a, 2015a) and Cervone (2012) for 
further insight into highland indigenous land struggles.  
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reform included both ‘routine’ and ‘contentious’ forms of politic action. Legislative proposals 
were one example of the former while protests, blockades and occupations were 
manifestations of the latter. Fourth, the episodes took place in the context of heightened land 
commodification. This is one of the factors that mark out this phase of land struggles from 
earlier stages. While the market had started to perform a greater role in determining the use 
and distribution of land in the early twentieth century, it became far more influential from the 
1960s as the traditional hacienda complex unravelled and capitalist modernisation advanced. 
 
Viewed in historical perspective the struggle to bring land under social and political 
control emerges as a movement of interconnected, if distinct, episodes of contention. 
Broadly, this can be seen as a Polanyian countermovement towards the regulation of markets 
and the establishment of institutions based on the principles of reciprocity and redistribution. 
Social movement theory enables us to specify this movement with greater precision. The 
‘contentious politics’ approach is particularly useful. Within this framework, social 
movements are seen as ‘sustained campaigns of claim making, using repeated performances 
that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that 
12 
 
sustain these activities’ (Tarrow and Tilly 2015, 237). The ‘campaigns’ and ‘bases’ of social 
movements are treated as two distinct components which implies movements transcend one 
particular group or organisation. The distinction also indicates social movement bases are not 
fixed but change over time.
18
 The bases of the movement to bring land under social and 
political control in Ecuador have exhibited these characteristics, comprising a diverse and 
shifting collection of rural communities, organisations, movements, religious activists and 
institutions, left-wing activists and parties, and transnational networks.  
The next sections explore this movement in greater depth. I start by analyzing political 
struggles over the design and character of land reform, before moving on to examine 
indigenous attempts to implement land reform from below. 
The Battle over the Design and Character of Land Reform  
Land reform debates started to simmer in Ecuador in the 1930s but did not come to the boil 
until the 1960s. Internal and external factors drove the issue up the political agenda. Due to a 
complex mix of social, political and economic changes in highland and lowland Ecuador, 
indigenous, peasant and leftist organisations started to increase the pressure on the state to 
redistribute land and transform the agrarian structure in the 1950s. The Cuban Revolution 
provided impetus at the end of the 1950s while the Alliance for Progress lent additional 
support at the beginning of the 1960s. Within the space of a decade the character of 
indigenous and peasant demands went from aiming to improve labour and living conditions 
on haciendas to attempting to unravel the traditional hacienda complex, redistribute land, and 
transform power relations.  
Mounting social and political pressure encouraged candidates in the 1960 presidential 
elections to commit to undertake land reform. Once in office, the victorious candidate, Jose 
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 Social movement bases comprise ‘movement organizations, networks, participants, and the accumulated 
cultural artifacts, memories, and traditions that contribute to social movement campaigns’ (Tarrow and Tilly 
2015, 148).  
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María Velasco Ibarra, established land reform commissions which included representatives of 
the state, military and landowning elite but excluded representatives of the peasantry (Barsky 
1988, 124-5) (Guerrero 1984, 107). This set the tone for the composition of the bodies 
charged with the task of designing and implementing land reform between 1964 and 1994. 
Indigenous, peasant, and left-wing organisations were able to exert pressure on the state 
through contentious forms of political action but were unable to exercise real influence over 
the legislature (CIDA 1965, 495). That, along with the absence of a sufficiently powerful pro-
reform camp with the military, government and bureaucracy, ensured the law that emerged 
out of the land reform debate of the early 1960s, Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización, 
largely, if not entirely, reflected landowning elite interests (RO 297 1964). 
The limited mechanisms the law established to regulate and redistribute land provided 
indigenous communities and organisations with a powerful incentive to attempt to transform 
land reform. The structure of the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización 
(IERAC) provided additional incentive. The institute, which was established in 1964, was 
responsible for regulating and redistributing land and overseeing land reform and 
colonisation. Indicating the commodifying dimensions of Ecuadorian land reform, IERAC 
was also charged with the task of promoting ‘the free trade of agricultural land with a view to 
creating land markets and promoting changes in private tenancy’ (Art. 164 RO 297 1964). 
The Consejo Directivo, the steering committee of the institute, comprised state officials and 
landowning elite representatives but excluded spokespersons of the indigenous and peasant 
population. The imbalance between landowning elites and indigenous peoples within the 
Consejo Directivo was accentuated by the strong links landowning elites established with the 
regional branches of the IERAC. For example, the Director of the Riobamba division of 
IERAC was also a prominent landowner in the Chimborazo region (El Espectador 
05/06/1972, 1-3). Elite influence limited IERAC’s ability to implement land reform and 
14 
 
enabled large landowners to secure favourable terms for land sold to the institute. The 
IERAC generally attempted to transfer the cost of land to beneficiaries which further reduced 
the redistributive impact of land reform.  
The Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI), which was established under the aegis of the 
Partido Comunista Ecuatoriana (PCE) in 1944, led the initial charge to overhaul land reform. 
The IERAC was the focus of its attack. The federation claimed the IERAC was run by 
‘oligarchs and latifundistas’ and demanded representation within the institute to counter elite 
influence (El Comercio 23/10/1966, 17). The state rebuffed its demands and increased the 
number of landowning elite representatives from two to three to rub salt into the wound (Art. 
3 RO 167 1967).   
The space for indigenous peoples to contest land reform widened in the early 1970s. 
Various factors were behind this shift but three were particularly important. First, the 
discovering of significant oil deposits in the northern Amazonian region of Ecuador in the 
late 1960s sent state-society relations into flux as the fiscal capacity of the state dramatically 
increased. The grip elites exerted over the state loosened and the state obtained the economic 
potential to accelerate land reform (Conaghan 1988). The Rodriguez Lara military 
government, which seized power in 1972, signalled its intention to radicalize reform, 
providing indigenous and peasant movements with hope of profound change. Second, the 
comprehensive land reform the Velasco Alvarado military government was undertaking in 
neighbouring Peru provided inspiration for political elites and technocrats in Ecuador as well 
as indigenous and peasant movements (Redclift 1978). Third, indigenous and peasant 
organization strengthened at the local, regional and national levels after the introduction of 
land reform which created a stronger platform for the rural poor to exert pressure on the state. 
The radicalization of the national peasant organization Federación Nacional de 
Organizaciones Campesinas (FENOC) and the establishment of the highland indigenous 
15 
 
movement Ecuarunari were manifestations of the general strengthening of the ‘base’ of the 
movement to bring land under social and political control.  
The Frente Unido de Reforma Agraria (FURA) emerged out of this milieu. The alliance, 
which was formed in 1972, brought together a range of peasant and indigenous organisations, 
including FENOC and Ecuarunari. The FURA spearheaded a series of marches and rallies 
across the sierra and the coast in late 1972 and early 1973, before convening a national 
meeting in August 1973, where it presented its own land reform proposal (Becker 2008).
19
   
The principal features of the proposal are outlined in Table 2. It aimed to increase the 
social and political control of land through a variety of mechanisms: i) impose meaningful 
upper limits on the size of landholdings; ii) proscribe foreign ownership of agricultural land; 
iii) place upper and lower limits on redistributed land; iv) prioritize the redistribution of land 
in collective form; and v) use outdated cadastral rather than market values to expropriate 
land. To increase the likelihood of these measures actually being implemented the proposal 
also aimed to transform the mechanisms and agencies through which land was regulated and 
redistributed: ‘the participation of peasant organisations in the planning and execution of 
agrarian reform at the local, regional, and national level is indispensable’ (Barsky 1988, 269-
70).  
Comparing the law that emerged out of the land reform debate of the early 1970s –  Ley de 
Reforma Agraria (LRA) - with the FURA proposal shows that the state failed to respond to 
indigenous and peasant demands (see Table 2 below). Fundamental differences were evident 
in relation to the regulation and redistribution of land. Moreover, indigenous and peasant 
demands for inclusion within public agencies responsible for designing and implementing 
land reform were emphatically rejected. The FURA’s failure to impose its vision of land 
reform on the state was compounded by the counter-reform measures the Rodriguez Lara 
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 The attention the FURA gave to the legal dimension of land reform was reflected in the FENOC’s decision to 
establish a team which specialised in agrarian law in the early 1970s (El Espectador, 16/06/1972, 3). 
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government introduced in 1974 and 1975. These changes laid the foundations for a more 
decisive dismantling of land reform in the late 1970s. Before handing over power to the 
civilian Roldós-Hurtado government (1979-84) at the end of the decade, the conservative 
military regime which replaced the Rodriguez Lara government in 1976 introduced a new 
law – Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario - which provided greater protection for 
private property rights and impeded the implementation of land reform (RO 792 1979). In 
doing so, the military bequeathed a complex and contradictory legal and bureaucratic 
framework which placed definite limits on land regulation and redistribution in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
Table 2  
Comparative analysis of Ley de Reforma Agraria and Frente Unido de Reforma 
Agraria proposal  
Dimension LRA FURA  
 Expropriation Min. 80 per cent of landholding 
‘efficiently’ exploited and min. 
‘average productivity’ by 
01/01/1976; efficient landholdings in 
areas of ‘great demographic 
pressure’; and land worked under 
‘precarious’ conditions 
Min. 80 per cent of cultivable land 
cultivated and min. ‘average 
productivity’; efficient landholdings in 
areas of ‘great demographic pressure’; 
land worked under ‘precarious’ 
conditions; land that exceeds 
landholding limits; and, foreign-owned 
land 
Expropriation value 1964 cadastral value plus 
compensation for investments on land 
(before 1975) and 10-year old 
cadastral values plus investments 
(from 1975) 
1964 cadastral value 
Redistributed land Price of land no greater than price 
paid by IERAC and redistribution to 
legally registered peasant 
organisations prioritised 
Price of land based on 1964 cadastral 
value; communal redistribution 
prioritised; and, lower and upper limits 
on redistributed land to individuals 
Landholding limits No limits Max. of 100 hectares (sierra) 
Land ownership  No limits Max. of 100 hectares (sierra) 
Indigenous/peasant 
representation in land 
reform agencies 
None Indigenous/peasant representation at 
the local, regional and national levels 
Foreign ownership No restrictions Proscription of foreign ownership of 
agricultural land  
Source:  My own elaboration based on Ley de Reforma Agraria, Registro Oficial 410, 15 October 1973; 
Pronunciamiento del Primer Encuentro Campesino por la Reforma Agraria a las Autoridades Gubermentales, Barsky 
1988, 263-72 
Notwithstanding the barriers the military regimes placed in front of land reform in the late 
1970s, indigenous and peasant organisations continued to call for radical changes to land 
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reform laws, policies and institutions in the early 1980s. The return to democracy in 1979 
provided greater space to contest land reform. Ecuarunari and FENOC organized a 10,000 
people strong mobilisation in Quito in 1980 to raise pressure on the Roldós-Hurtado 
government, convened the Primer Encuentro Nacional Campesino Indígena in 1982, and 
demanded ‘agrarian reform with peasant control’ (Becker 2008, 164). The lack of land 
available to most highland indigenous families and communities provided a powerful 
incentive for indigenous movements to continue the struggle to bring land under social and 
political control.  Ecuarunari painted a powerful picture of the situation confronting highland 
indigenous peoples at this stage: 
Our fundamental problem is that the majority of us have a small parcel of land 
that does not yield enough to support our families nor satisfy our most basic 
needs. If our parents or we were able to secure a huasipungo or plot of land, we or 
our children do not even have a handful of land…What land are we going to leave 
our children? None! We cannot divide our land anymore (Ecuarunari 1984, 16). 
The anger and frustration that bursts from this passage came to a head in 1990 when the 
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) launched a 
levantamiento – uprising - which transformed indigenous-state relations and propelled land 
reform up the political agenda.
20
 Growing out of the occupation of the iconic Santa Domingo 
Church in Quito, the levantamiento swept across the highlands as indigenous protestors 
blocked roads, took to the streets and occupied land and buildings (Hoy 30/05/1990, 7A; El 
Comercio 08/06/1990, A-1). Indicating the challenges indigenous peoples faced at the local 
level, Leon Zamosc notes ‘that it was primarily the community-based local and regional 
organizations that took the initiative and coordinated popular participation’ (Zamosc 1994, 
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  The CONAIE was formed in 1986 to create a national platform to voice indigenous concerns. It comprises 
the principal regional indigenous movements of the highlands and lowlands and numerous provincial and local 
organisations and communities. It is the largest indigenous movement in Ecuador and one of the most important 
social movements in Latin America.  
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53).
21
 Building on this groundswell of support, the CONAIE made sixteen demands, 
including the redistribution and legalisation of land, resolution of land conflicts, and 
transformation of Ecuador into a plurinational state.  
The 1990 levantamiento provided a platform for indigenous peoples to intensify their 
efforts to bring land under social and political control.
22
 The Coordinadora Agraria Nacional 
(CAN) was formed in the wake of the levantamiento to channel this demand.
23
 Following a 
nation-wide consultation, the CAN submitted a legislative proposal - Ley Agraria Integral del 
Ecuador – to Congress in June 1993 (see Table 3 below). Like the FURA, the CAN aimed to 
give indigenous and peasant movements a prominent role in the implementation of land 
reform: ‘organized rural civil society should perform a lead role in putting Ley Agraria into 
motion’ while ‘the state should perform a very specific function: administer the law in a fair, 
agile, and appropriate manner’ (CAN 1993, 2). The degree of social control the CAN 
demanded was based on the belief that ‘the market does not have the capacity to rationalize 
access to land’ (CAN 1993, 2). This was reflected in the mechanisms the proposal aimed to 
create to redistribute land and the numerous restrictions it sought to place on the ownership 
and transfer of land. In short, the proposal recognized a role for land markets in the rural 
economy but one that was subject to social and political control.  
Rather than seriously consider the CAN proposal the conservative Durán Ballén 
government (1992-96) elected to introduce a bill that promoted the interests of landowning 
elites, national capitalist enterprises, transnational corporations and multilateral institutions. 
Drawing inspiration from a proposal developed by IDEA, a think tank with close links to 
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 See also Almeida et al. (1991).  
22
  The levantamiento also contributed to the launch of a land purchase scheme overseen by the Fondo 
Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), a NGO with close links to the Catholic Church. Between 1990 and 
1995, the intiative helped over 5,000 agricultural producers purchase approximately 27,000 hectares of land in 
the highland region. See Navarro et al. (1996) for a comprehensive analysis of the scheme. See also Bretón 
(2008b) and Goodwin (2014).  
23
 The CAN was spearheaded by the CONAIE but included a number of other indigenous and peasant 
organisations and movements, including FENOCIN.  
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landowning elites and USAID, the executive branch of the government sent its rural 
development proposal – Ley de Ordenamiento del Sector Agrario - to Congress as a matter of 
economic urgency in early May 1994 (Hoy 06/05/1994, A-6).   
The move prompted CONAIE to demand Congress ‘study and approve’ the CAN proposal 
(Hoy 06/05/1994, A-6; Sawyer 2004, 154). In the event, the executive proposal was rejected 
by Congress but voting was driven by political infighting between factions of the right rather 
than concern over issues raised by the CONAIE. The original executive proposal provided the 
basis for the hastily redrafted law – Ley de Desarrollo Agrario (LDA) – which was approved 
by Congress in early June. Luis Macas, president of the CONAIE, declared: ‘we are not going 
to remain with our arms crossed, knelt on our knees, we will demonstrate our capacity to 
fight’ (El Comercio 09/06/1994, A-1).  
The possibility of CONAIE launching another levantamiento failed to deter President Sixto 
Durán Ballén from approving the law (El Comercio 14/06/1994, A-1). CONAIE’s reaction 
was twofold: i) register a formal complaint with the Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales 
and ii) launch a nationwide levantamiento – the ‘Movilización por la Vida’ - which swept 
across the highland and lowland regions of the country in late June.
24
  The twin-pronged 
attack forced the government to negotiate over the content of the law. The negotiations, which 
took place within a commission formed by the government, lasted more than two weeks and 
included the president, various branches of the state, representatives of the Catholic Church, 
indigenous and peasant organisations and the landowning elite (El Comercio 27/06/1994, A-
1).  
There is some dispute in the literature over the impact of the levantamiento on the 
legislation.  Victor Bretón, for example, notes a number of changes between the original and 
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 The 1994 uprising resembled the 1990 levantamiento in form but was more actively supported by lowland 
indigenous communities and movements.   See Guerrero (1996) and Sawyer (2004) for insight into the 1994 
uprising.  
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approved versions of the law but argues the ‘real fundamental differences were minimal’ 
(Bretón 1997, 71-2). William Waters, by contrast, claims the indigenous movement was able 
to leave a considerable imprint on the legislation, contending ‘the mobilization showed that 
indigenous proposals for agrarian reform legislation emerged as the yardstick against which 
other proposals would be measured. The attempt by landowner associations, conservative 
politicians, and the government to bypass that proposal ultimately failed’ (Waters 1995, 15). 
Table 3  
Comparative analysis of Ley de Desarrollo Agrario and Coordinadora Agraria 
Nacional proposal  
Dimension CAN* LDA** 
Role of  the market Marginal and constrained  Central and expanded  
Expropriation  Ten grounds including the 
expropriation of land due to ‘great 
demographic pressure’.  
Four grounds including the 
expropriation of land which does not 
fulfil its social functions on the grounds 
of ‘great demographic pressure’.  
Expropriation value Current cadastral value plus 
investments. 
Commercial value. 
Payment for redistributed 
land 
90 per cent covered by the state and 
10 per cent by the recipient. 
100 per cent assumed by the recipient.  
Restrictions on the 
division and transfer of 
privately owned land 
Division of landholdings less than 10 
hectares restricted; authorisation to 
divide landholdings above 10 
hectares; transfer of minifundia 
limited; and division of redistributed 
land proscribed. 
None.  
Regulation of communal 
land 
Division of communal land 
prohibited.  
Division of communal land permitted 
with two-thirds community approval 
except páramo and forest. 
Indigenous/peasant 
representation in land 
reform agencies 
Two indigenous and peasant 
representatives within Comisión 
Técnica-Consultora and indigenous 
and peasant influence over 
appointment of the Director 
Ejecutivo of the IERA.  
Two indigenous, peasant, and 
afroecuatoriano representatives within 
Consejo Superior of INDA. 
Financing of land 
reform/development 
institute  
Revenues streams from i) oil and 
mining; ii) ecotourism; iii) import 
and export duties; and iv) foreign 
direct investment 
No specific revenue streams stipulated.  
Source: My own elaboration based on CAN (1993), RO 524 (1994), and RO 55 (1997). * Proyecto de Ley Agraria 
Integral del Ecuador (CAN 1993)  ** Ley de Desarrollo Agrario (RO 55 1997) and Reglamento General de la Ley de 
Desarrollo Agrario (RO 524 1994). 
Indigenous pressure undoubtedly forced a number of important revisions, especially in 
relation to communal and ancestral land. Yet, as Table 3 demonstrates, the final version of the 
LDA was far removed from the CAN proposal, providing support for Bretón’s version of 
events. The starkest difference related to the role assigned to the market. Whereas the CAN 
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proposed a marginal and constrained role, the LDA promoted a central and enlarged function. 
The commodifying aim of the law was enthusiastically stated: ‘The sale and purchase and 
transfer of privately owned agricultural land are free and require the authorization of no one’ 
(Art. 35 RO 55 1997). Travelling in the same direction, the law also increased protection for 
private property rights by virtually ruling out expropriation and ensuring landowners were 
entitled to receive the commercial value of land in the unlikely event a legal basis for 
expropriation was established.  
The space the LDA created for representatives of indigenous and peasant organisations 
within the Consejo Superior of the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario (INDA) should 
be seen in light of the highly circumscribed redistributive dimensions of the law. Indigenous 
and peasant organisation achieved their long-standing aim of securing representation within 
the institute responsible for overseeing land reform but only when it was incapable of 
performing the task. The Consejo Superior was toothless.  Decisions related to the 
expropriation of land were taken by the Director Executivo and Directores Distritales rather 
than the Consejo Superior. Waters suggests granting authority to the Directores Distritales 
was a positive step because at that local level ‘presumably, local indigenous voices could be 
better heard’ (Waters 1995, 9). But the bureaucratic structure of INDA was actually designed 
to work in the opposite direction: to limit the power of the national committees which 
included indigenous and peasant representatives.  The Duran Ballén administration therefore 
followed previous governments in rebuffing demands to create genuine space for indigenous 
and peasant involvement in the regulation and redistribution of land. Despite considerable 
indigenous resistance, the government effectively drew three decades of land reform to a 
close. 
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Implementing Land Reform from Below: Indigenous Struggles to Secure Land via the State 
The failure of indigenous and peasant movements to transform the legal and institutional 
structure of land reform was reflected in the relatively small amount of land redistributed in 
the highland region between 1964 and 1994. Table 4 (below), which is based on a full official 
dataset of land reform, shows the total and relative amount of land redistributed at the 
regional and provincial levels.
25
 The overall amount of land redistributed totalled 580,962 
hectares which represented approximately 12 per cent of the regional agricultural land 
surface. Figure 2 (below) maps the relationship between the total amount of land redistributed 
and the density of the indigenous population in each of the highland provinces. The two 
variables are positively related which gives a broad indication of the relative success 
indigenous peoples enjoyed in securing land.
26
  While not representative of the thousands of 
cases that took place in the highlands over three decades, the following examples provide 
insight into this struggle.  
Land reform opened three broad avenues for indigenous peoples to secure land: i) the 
dissolution of traditional peasant-patron practices; ii) redistribution of state-owned land and 
iii) expropriation and redistribution of privately owned land.  
Huasipungo was the most widespread traditional peasant-patron practice in the highland 
region in the 1960s.
27
 Its dissolution, which was one the principal aims of Ecuadorian land 
reform, provided opportunities for indigenous peoples to secure formal titles to land. Official 
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 There are a number of factors that need to be taken into account when interpreting the data presented in Table 
4 and Figure 2. First, the size and quality of land redistributed via IERAC variedly enormously.  Redistributed 
land was generally, though not universally, poor quality and large tracts of páramo – high-altitude grassland – 
were transferred, especially in Chimborazo and Cotopaxi. Second, the data exclude private and Catholic Church 
land transfer initiatives which took place before the creation of IERAC or without the involvement of the 
institute once it was established. Third, the land redistribution and agricultural census data include land located 
in the subtropical lowland regions of highland provinces so the figures do not precisely match the actual 
highland region. See Goodwin (2014) for a detailed explanation of the characteristics and limitations of the data.  
26
 Zamosc (1995) reports a similar finding using a different methodology and land redistribution dataset.  
27
 Put simply, huasipungo involved the exchange of the labour power of indigenous peasant families for usufruct 
rights to small plots of land.  
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land reform data indicate 76,054 hectares were transferred to 18,840 huasipungueros between 
1964 and 1994 (average plot of four hectares). The conversion of usufruct rights into private 
property rights was rarely like for like: the relocation of indigenous families and communities 
to smaller and/or less productive land was widespread.
28
 Resettlement was often staunchly 
opposed but indigenous peoples were frequently left in precarious positions following the 
dissolution of huasipungo. The story a former indigenous worker on a hacienda in 
Chimborazo recounted to Carola Lentz highlights this point: ‘We have not received justice 
according to agrarian reform. We did not know the laws at that stage, we were not organized. 
Because of that they did not give us huasipungos only selling, selling, and selling’ (Lentz 
1997, 54-5).  
Table 4  
Total and relative amount of land redistributed in Highland 
Ecuador between 1964 and 1994 
Province Total land 
redistributed*  
Percentage of total 
land redistributed  
Percentage of land 
surface ** 
Azuay 29,884 5.15 4.88 
Bolivar 16,684 2.87 4.38 
Cañar 49,005 8.44 18.98 
Carchi 17,335 2.98 9.95 
Chimborazo 121,349 20.89 25.74 
Cotopaxi 70,465 12.13 15.41 
Imbabura 14,595 2.51 5.15 
Loja 155,734 26.81 15.65 
Pichincha 73,441 12.65 7.93 
Tungurahua 32,471 5.59 15.91 
Total 580,962 100.00 12.20 
Source: My own elaboration based on INDA-IERAC and INEC (2000). * Hectares ** 
Percentage of provincial agricultural land surface reported in 2000 Censo Agropecuario 
Nacional  
The worker’s recollection highlights three important features of land reform in the 
highland region: 1) the lack of indigenous organization at the local level supported 
landowning elite efforts to circumvent the law; 2) land reform stimulated land market 
activity; and, 3) the failure of the state to communicate and implement land reform. The last 
point was demonstrated by the number of indigenous families and communities who were 
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  See, for example, Taveras (1977) and Lyons (2006). 
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unaware land reform even existed in the 1960s and 1970s. This was true of one of the 
communities I visited and interviewed in Guamote, Chimborazo. It was not until the build-up 
to the introduction of Ley de Reforma Agraria in 1973 that the community became aware of 
land reform (i.e. nearly a decade after the Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización was 
introduced). One of the community elders explained that following a wave of indigenous 
protests and invasions a rumour began to circulate that ‘the huasipungueros were going to 
take the land from the elites’. The introduction of the law and the upsurge of protests 
prompted landowning elites to start selling land to local indigenous families, some of whom 
were able to buy small plots. The community purchased plots of marginal land from 
landowning elites who retained the most productive sections of the estate by transferring land 
between family members. The combination of land reform and indigenous pressure opened 
spaces for the indigenous community to secure land but significant sacrifice was required to 
obtain land via the market: ‘this is how we became indebted to buy a small plot of land’. 
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State-owned haciendas provided another potential source of land for indigenous peoples. 
The bulk of this land was managed by the welfare agency Asistencia Social. The total stock 
registered in the highlands prior to start of land reform was estimated at 132,853 hectares 
(CIDA 1965, 112). Redistribution tended to involve the allocation of small amounts of land 
to families as well as the transfer of larger plots of agricultural and pastoral land to 
agricultural cooperatives. While this provided some indigenous families and communities 
with a more straightforward route to secure land, sustained and concerted pressure was 
required to activate and accelerate redistribution.  
The redistribution of state-owned land in the northern highland canton of Cayambe 
highlighted this point. Indigenous-state tensions were evident on numerous levels. The cost of 
land was a particular issue.
29
 The Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG) clearly 
captures this point: 
For its part, the FEI has consistently maintained the aspiration for an agrarian 
reform in which the cost of the land does not fall on the campesinos. By contrast, 
the IERAC has always insisted in transferring the cost of the land to the 
beneficiaries, a characteristic that has defined the Ecuadorian agrarian reform 
model, a view based on law.
30
 (MAG 1977b, 50) 
The mode of redistribution was another source of conflict. The state’s attempts to impose 
cooperative forms of agricultural production on traditional indigenous communities and 
retain a high degree of control over the redistributed land caused considerable tension 
(Martinez 1995). Workers from various state-owned haciendas launched a series of strikes 
and invasions in the late 1960s demanding ‘free reign’ over the haciendas and the expulsion 
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 The strain the price of land placed on indigenous peoples was evident in a letter the Simon Bolivar 
cooperative sent to IERAC in 1971 which requested the postponement of a loan repayment for twelve months. 
Hacienda Pesillo, Cayambe, Pichincha, IERAC archive, MAG, Quito.  
30
 The Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización actually implied state-owned land should be redistributed to 
indigenous peoples without cost but supplementary legislation issued in 1965 established a legal basis to charge 
indigenous families and communities (Art. 13 RO 502 1965). 
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of IERAC (El Comercio 29/10/1966, 14; El Comercio 30/10/1966, 3). The military and 
civilian governments of the late 1960s refused to cede to their demands and employed 
military force to quell indigenous resistance. Writing at the time, Muriel Crespi noted: ‘new 
concessions were won, but the haciendas still belong to the patrons’ (Crespi 1971, 236). 
However, sustained indigenous pressure was able to increase indigenous control over the 
cooperatives.  Glossing over the intense struggle behind the change, the MAG noted this shift 
in the late 1970s: ‘IERAC initially took responsibility for all of the production of the zone, 
constituting a type of state enterprise; however, that state enterprise has been slowly 
converted into self-managed cooperatives’ (MAG 1977a, 52).  
The redistribution of state-owned land elsewhere in the sierra took different forms but 
tended to have limited reach in terms of the number of families and communities involved. 
One important factor that limited access to land was the failure of IERAC to redistribute the 
entire stock of state-owned land. My calculations suggest 30,547 hectares of land were not 
redistributed after three decades of reform.
31
 However, this estimate appears conservative. 
State agencies involved in land reform reported the total stock of Asistencia Social land in the 
late 1970s was 169,767 hectares and noted ‘ex-Asistencia Social landholdings exist which 
still have not been transferred to the IERAC’ (MAG-IERAC-JUNAPLA 1977, 51). There are 
a number of possible explanations for IERAC’s apparent failure to redistribute all the land. 
The unreliability and inconsistency of the data may explain some of the shortfall. However, 
this is unlikely to account for the entire amount. The time IERAC took to divide and 
redistribute Asistencia Social estates and the value of the most productive sections of the 
haciendas suggest at least some of the land was sold to landowning elites, agricultural 
enterprises, and urban developers rather than redistributed to peasant families and 
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 I derived this estimate by subtracting the stock of state-owned land recorded in the early 1960s (CIDA 1965, 
112) from the total amount of state-owned land IERAC redistributed between 1964 and 1994 (IERAC-INDA).  
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communities.  This explanation is consistent with the state’s overall attitude to land reform 
which oscillated between disinterest and disdain.  
Privately owned land was the last route for indigenous peoples to obtain land. This was far 
more problematic because of the protection land reform granted to private property rights and 
the degree of influence landowning elites exerted over the government, the IERAC and the 
judiciary. Yet indigenous families and communities were able to secure privately owned land 
through sustained collective organization and mobilization.  
Events in Chimborazo in the 1970s indicate the pressure indigenous peoples exerted on the 
state to enforce existing legislation and implement land reform from below. Indicating the 
opening the arrival of a military regime ostensibly committed to radicalizing land reform 
provided for indigenous mobilization, the FEI organized a 50,000 people strong indigenous 
march in the town of Palmira to demand the Rodriguez Lara government accelerate 
redistribution (El Espectador 05/06/1972, 1).
32
 The protestors presented local officials with a 
list of ten demands which centred on the application of existing land reform legislation and 
the investigation of alleged corrupt activities of IERAC (El Espectador 05/06/1972, 1-3). 
Hacienda Galte, which covered 11,000 hectares of high-altitude land and incorporated 
approximately 2,000 indigenous peoples, was one of the cases the FEI singled out for 
investigation. Official reports into the dissolution of the hacienda suggest the claims of the 
indigenous protestors were well founded. Reflecting the ability of landowning elites to secure 
high prices for the land they sold to the IERAC, MAG noted that the institute had paid an 
‘excessive price’ for the estate (MAG 1977c, 11). The collective organization of indigenous 
workers performed a crucial role in the redistribution of the land. Under pressure from the 
FEI, the institute dissolved the 158 huasipungo contracts, redistributed approximately 3,000 
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 Days later the same newspaper reported 200,000 protesters had attended the march.  (El Espectador 
09/06/1972, 5)  
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hectares to former huasipungueros without cost, and provided families with collective use of 
2,000 hectares of páramo. IERAC archive materials indicate the pressure indigenous peoples 
placed on the authorities enabled them to secure larger plots of land.
33
 Official records show 
huasipungueros received average plots of 10 hectares, significantly above the four hectare 
regional average.
34
 Once the initial phase of redistribution was complete, the IERAC 
proposed the sale of the rest of the hacienda at a similar price to the one it had paid the 
landowner but indigenous workers ‘emphatically and repeatedly’ rejected its proposal (MAG 
1977c, 7). Mirroring struggles in Cayambe, the FEI demanded that the entire hacienda be 
redistributed to indigenous families and communities without cost. The two parties failed to 
reach agreement and the land that had not been transferred to the indigenous workers was 
temporarily converted into an IERAC managed enterprise. The MAG argued that the sale of 
land at the price proposed by IERAC would be ‘ruinous’ for the indigenous and 
recommended the collective sale of the land at a price significantly below the price the 
IERAC had paid (MAG 1977c, 13-4). The remaining sections of the hacienda were 
redistributed in the late 1970s and early 1980s (IERAC 1984, 5). Indigenous mobilization 
was not only influential in determining the amount of land redistributed but also in 
determining the conditions under which the land was transferred. 
The ultimately successful attempt of a group of indigenous families and communities to 
force the expropriation and redistribution of Hacienda Quinchuquí, which stretched across 
approximately 700 hectares of good quality land in the northern highland canton of Otavalo, 
provides further evidence of the role indigenous organization performed in implementing 
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 Informes de Linderación, Hacienda Galte, Palmira, Chimborazo, IERAC archive, MAG, Quito.  
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 Official records also show that the plots huasipungueros received varied in size, suggesting land reform 
embedded inequalities that existed between indigenous families on the traditional hacienda. This was a common 
pattern in the highland region. Breton (2015a), for example, reports a similar finding in Cotopaxi. It is worth 
recalling that the FURA attempted to impose upper and lower limits on redistributed land to reduce or limit the 
stratification of land ownership and create a more egalitarian land distribution. 
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land reform from below.
35
 The first expropriation claim, as Sergio Huarcaya explains in his 
illuminating analysis of the case, was made in 1977 (Huarcaya 2012, 203-69). Following the 
guidelines set out in land reform legislation, the members of the eight communities involved 
in the land dispute channelled their demand through a pre-cooperative which was established 
to make the claim. The authorities rejected their demand in 1978. Some members of the 
cooperative left after the decision but the majority remained and lodged another claim in 
1978 on the grounds of ‘great demographic pressure’. While the end of military rule failed to 
halt landowner and police repression, conditions proved more conducive to force the 
expropriation of the hacienda. The authorities ruled in favour of the claimants in 1981 and 
around one third of the hacienda was transferred to the cooperative via IERAC in 1983, 
nearly seven years after the initial claim was lodged.  
The case highlights the crucial role leadership, alliances and movements performed in 
spreading knowledge of land reform and providing indigenous families and communities 
with the knowhow to make expropriation claims. This was evident on various levels. The 
indigenous leaders of the pre-cooperative communicated the details of land reform legislation 
to members of neighbouring communities, many of whom were  unaware land reform even 
existed. The FENOC also performed a vital role in diffusing knowledge of land reform, 
organizing events which included ‘indigenous leaders who spoke about their experience in 
successful land claims in other parts of the country’ (Huarcaya 2012, 240). The members of 
the pre-cooperative also received support from left-wing lawyers and politicians who helped 
them build a legal case. Indigenous leaders therefore worked closely with external actors, 
reflecting a broader pattern in the highland region in the late twentieth century.
36
 The case 
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 Some of the details included within the analysis of this case are based on personal communication with Sergio 
Huarcaya.  I would like to thank Sergio for graciously sharing his research.  
36
 Victor Bretón’s penetrating analysis of these relationships shows indigenous communities and leaders 
received support from a variety of leftist activists and organisations, including members of the Movimiento 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) who provided language teaching and assistance (Bretón 2015a, 2015b). See 
also Becker (2008).  
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also illuminates another important feature of indigenous struggles over land reform: 
indigenous knowledge of the legal underpinnings of land reform and legal obstacles to the 
implementation of land reform increased simultaneously from the 1970s onwards. The 
injustice, anger and frustration this engendered were important factors behind the 1990 and 
1994 levantamientos. CONAIE’s declaration at the 1990 uprising captured this sentiment: 
‘Efforts have been exhausted through legal channels: the people have their say’ (Navarro et 
al. 1996, 279). Indigenous and peasant movements attempted to create a more appropriate 
and equitable legal and institutional framework to regulate and redistribute land but the 
conservative Duran Ballén government refused to take their demands seriously. Twenty years 
later the Rafael Correa government looks set to follow a similar path.  
ECHOES FROM THE PAST: EFFORTS TO BRING LAND UNDER SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL CONTROL UNDER RAFAEL CORREA 
Writing some years after his first election victory in 2006, Rafael Correa claimed the political 
movement he represents proposed a ‘revolution, understood as a radical and rapid change in 
the existing structures of Ecuadorian society’ (Correa 2012, 90).37  But the path the Correa 
governments have followed has been neither revolutionary nor radical. Nowhere has this 
been more evident than in relation to land.   The president and government have pledged to 
oversee a ‘revolución agraria’  but have shown little interest in tackling issues related to the 
use, control, and distribution of land.
38
 
The agrarian policy line the Correa governments have followed has diverged from the 
2008 constitution which demands the state ensures equitable access to land through 
regulation and redistribution. Echoing earlier episodes of contention, pressure has come from 
below to transform agrarian laws and policies. The clearest indication of this came in March 
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 Rafael Correa has been in power in Ecuador since 2007, having won presidential elections in 2006, 2009 and 
2013, the last two in the first round.   
38
 See Carrion (2013) and Berry et al. (2014). 
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2012 when the Red Agraria Nacional (RAN) – a national coalition of rural social movements 
– submitted the Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Tierras y Territorios to the National Assembly 
in Quito. The Polanyian character of the proposal shines through in the opening passages:
39
 
The organizations that represent the productores and productoras, comunas, 
communidades, pueblos and nacionalidades, afroecuatorianos, and montubios 
will participate in the implementation of this law on various levels to ensure the 
efficient execution of the regulations. This reflects the fact that land is not a 
commodity subject only to the rule of the market but also to the control of society 
(RAN 2012, 9).
40
 
Three principal mechanism of social and political control are proposed. The first, the 
Asamblea Plurinacional e Intercultural de Soberanía Alimentaria, aims to provide a forum 
for a broad spectrum of rural actors to discuss agrarian issues and policies, with the emphasis 
on increasing food sovereignty. The second, the Fondo Nacional de Tierras, seeks to regulate 
the use, control, and distribution of land, with the ultimate aim of preventing monopolisation 
and providing equitable access to land. To increase the likelihood of the fund achieving these 
objectives, the proposal seeks the incorporation of various sectors of rural society in the 
steering committee, including landless workers, afroecuatorianos, indigenous peoples and 
female agricultural producers. The third mechanism, Comisiones Cantonales de Tierras y 
Territorios, aims to support the implementation of the law at the local level.  
The RAN therefore follows the FEI, FURA and CAN in attempting to carve out spaces for 
social involvement in the regulation and redistribution of land at the national level. Yet the 
RAN surpasses previous efforts both in terms of the mechanisms proposed to increase social 
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 The Polanyian nature of the current struggle was also emphasised by a member of the RAN I interviewed in 
Quito in December 2011. Loyda Oliva, one of the national leaders of FENOCIN, emphatically stated that ‘land 
is not a commodity but part of the sovereignty of the peoples’.  
40
 Spanish is retained to capture the plural and inclusive spirit of the proposal.  
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control and the actors involved in the process. For example, the proposed inclusion of female 
representatives within agencies charged with the task of regulating and redistributing land is 
entirely new. Other important features of the proposal include upper limits on the size of 
private landholdings; new social and environmental functions of land; expropriation on the 
grounds of poverty; and progressive land taxes. Crucially, the RAN is therefore not merely 
attempting to overturn neoliberal policies but introduce a variant of land reform that goes well 
beyond the programmes implemented between 1964 and 1994.  
Why have the Correa governments failed to respond to demands to increase the social and 
political control of land? 
41
  
Since the approval of the new constitution the Correa governments have had sufficient 
power in the legislature to introduce a new land law which suggests other factors have been at 
play.
42
 The relative weakness of indigenous movements and the complex relationship 
between the movements and the government have been crucial. Unlike Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Rafael Correa came to power at a time when indigenous movements were relatively 
weak. CONAIE’s brief but costly association with the Lucio Gutierrez government (2002-5) 
damaged its credibility and created deep divisions within the movement. Correa’s arrival then 
sent indigenous-state relations into flux.
43
 Whereas the distinctly neoliberal policies of 
previous regimes provided indigenous movements with a clear point of attack, the heterodox 
policies and nationalist rhetoric of the Correa governments have proved harder to contest. 
Moreover, the investment the governments have made in welfare, health, education and 
infrastructure has won them support from a number of indigenous peoples, communities and 
leaders. Some members of CONAIE have advocated a hostile relationship with the 
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 The land law the government has promoted diverges sharply from the RAN proposal. See ‘¿Qué Ley de 
Tierras nos ofrece el gobierno y qué Ley de Tierras planteamos las organizaciones en el año 2012?’, interview 
with Luis Andrango, former president of FENOCIN, Observatorio de Cambio Rural, 20/06/15.  
42
  The government held a simple majority in the National Assembly between 2009 and 2013 and have enjoyed 
an absolute majority since 2013.  
43
 See Martínez Novo (2014).  
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government, while others have demanded a closer position. The measures the president and 
government have used to weaken, divide and delegitimise CONAIE have also been 
influential.
44
  
Cracks have also widened within the broader indigenous and peasant movement as other 
indigenous and peasant organisations have renegotiated their relationships with the state. 
FENOCIN, which remains the largest multi-ethnic peasant movement in Ecuador, has 
maintained cordial, if at times strained, relations with the government. Tensions between 
CONAIE and FENOCIN, which have been evident since the 1970s, have precluded full 
cooperation on important issues. Notably, the RAN excludes the former but includes the 
latter. While CONAIE has indicated its willingness to collaborate with RAN and demanded 
the government deliver a genuine ‘revolución agraria’, it has taken a less prominent role in 
pushing for a new land law. To some extent this reflects the battles indigenous families, 
communities, organisations, and movements won in the highlands and lowlands during land 
struggles in the late twentieth century. Indigenous communities that were able to increase 
control of land at the local level have been less motivated to push for regulation and 
redistribution at the national level. The stratification of indigenous land ownership has added 
another layer of complexity. In some areas of the highlands, land redistribution would 
involve transforming the structure of land ownership within and between indigenous 
communities, which makes organising a land reform movement along ethnic lines 
problematic.  The increased absorption of indigenous workers into the agroexport sector and 
urban labour markets, the inability of small agricultural producers to compete in national and 
international markets, and the emergence of a new generation of indigenous leaders less 
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 Tactics have included relentless state propaganda, threatening and imprisoning indigenous leaders and 
protestors, disrupting indigenous mobilisations, and co-opting the bases of the indigenous movement.  
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entrenched in land struggles and more orientated towards rural development have also 
contributed to the relative lack of pressure the CONAIE has exerted.
45
  
The absence of a powerful, broad-based indigenous and peasant movement capable of 
exerting significant pressure on the state has enabled the Correa governments to sidestep 
issues related to land, avoid serious confrontations with landowning elites, and leave the 
primary export model intact. The free-trade agreement the Correa government has signed 
with the European Union has provided a clear indication of the influence agroexporters have 
exerted over economic policy. The fact medium and large-scale capitalist firms appear to 
have been the primary beneficiaries of public spending on agriculture under Correa provides 
further evidence of the lack of substantive change (Carrión 2013). Despite the lip service the 
Correa governments have paid to food sovereignty, their agrarian policies have been 
orientated towards agroexport and agroindustry and embedded rather than ruptured land 
inequalities.  
The inability of rural grassroots organisations and social movements to force a radical 
break in agrarian policies in Ecuador indicates a crucial, if at times overlooked, feature of the 
double movement: widespread decommodification only materializes if countermovements 
accumulate sufficient political power to force states to implement laws and policies that limit 
and reverse commodification. 
 
   
                                                          
45
 Taking a wider view of indigenous organizational activity in the 1980s and 1990s, two broad trends were 
evident: indigenous movements against commodification through land reform (and other measures orientated 
towards controlling markets) and towards commodification through rural development (and other initiatives 
aimed at expanding markets). These two seemingly contradictory trends are not inconsistent with Polanyian 
theory: social classes and groups can simultaneously appear on both sides of the double movement, pushing for 
decommodification in some areas while supporting commodification in others. However, this clearly has the 
potential to create divisions, limit collective organization and mobilization, and reduce the likelihood of radical 
changes in economic and political structures. See Breton (2008a, 2008b, 2015b) for insight into indigenous 
engagement in rural development projects in the highland region and the impact it had on indigenous 
organisations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the 1960s rural social movements have attempted to force the Ecuadorian state to 
introduce and implement laws and policies that increase the regulation and redistribution of 
land. Drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi, I have characterized this struggle as the attempt 
to bring land under social and political control in the face of mounting commodification. The 
struggle has involved attempting to integrate representatives of indigenous and peasant 
movements into agencies responsible for regulating and redistributing land at the national 
level and expand family and community control of land at the local level.  During the late 
twentieth century, indigenous and peasant movements failed to transform the overriding 
structure of land reform. However, sustained organization and mobilization enabled 
indigenous families and communities to force the redistribution of land in various cases. The 
gains some indigenous peoples won show that even when states have little interest in 
redistributing land collective pressure from below has the potential to force them to 
implement land reform in particular cases. The flipside of this is that when states are free 
from sustained social pressure they are likely to avoid land reform and favour policies that do 
not threaten landowning elites or challenge power relations. The recent conflict in Ecuador 
illustrates this point. Rural social movements have proposed a radical new land law but a lack 
of sustained pressure has enabled the Correa regime to sidestep issues related to the use, 
control and distribution of land.   Divisions within and between indigenous and peasant 
movements have prevented the formation of a broad-based movement capable of exerting 
real influence over the government. Muted pressure from indigenous and peasant families 
and communities has also been crucial. The recent conflict has lacked the community driven 
mobilization which fuelled the indigenous levantamientos in the 1990s.  I have claimed that 
this is partly due to changes in patterns of highland indigenous land ownership that took place 
under land reform. Indigenous families and communities who have increased control of land 
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at the local level have been less interested in pushing for changes in land laws and policies at 
the national level. The stratification of indigenous land ownership also appears to have 
weakened demands for radical change. Land reform performed a critical role in this process. 
On the one hand, land reform agencies made little effort to change existing patterns of land 
control among indigenous families on traditional haciendas. Land redistribution therefore 
generally embedded or widened existing inequalities. On the other hand, land reform 
expanded land markets and created opportunities for some indigenous families to purchase 
and accumulate land.  This highlights the critical importance of understanding historical 
processes of land reform and land commodification and gauging the impact of these 
processes on indigenous and peasant land ownership and social and political organization. 
The theoretical framework I have elaborated in this article help us explore these processes. 
However, further work is required, particularly on the formation and operation of 
countermovements, the interaction between reciprocal, redistributive and market principles 
and mechanisms, and the relationship between land reform and the wider political and global 
economy. I hope this article paves the way for future research in this direction, drawing on 
the work of Karl Polanyi but revising and extending his concepts to provide a clearer picture 
of land struggles of the past and present in the Global South.   
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